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These bodily members are, as it were, no more than garments; 
which, because they have been attached to us for a long time, we 
think are us, or parts of us [and] the cause of this is the long period of 
adherence: we are accustomed  to remove clothes and to throw them 
down, which we are entirely unaccustomed to do with our bodily 
membersi. 
Avicenna, De Anima V.7 
 
As interface, the skin is obsolete…The clothing of the body with 
membranes embedded with alternate sensory and input/output 
devices creates the possibility of more intimate and enhanced 
interactivity. Subjectively, the body experiences itself as a more 
extruded system, rather than an enclosed structure. The self 
becomes situated beyond the skinii. 





Advanced biological brains are by nature open-ended opportunistic 
controllers. Such controllers compute, pretty much on a moment-to-
moment basis, what problem-solving resources are readily available 
and recruit them into temporary problem-solving wholes. Neural 
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plasticity, exaggerated in our own species, makes it possible for such 
resources to become factored deep into both our cognitive and 
physical problem-solving routines. One way to think about this is to 
depict the biological brain as a master of what I shall dub ‘ecological 
control’. Ecological control is the kind of top-level control that does 
not micro-manage every detail, but rather encourages substantial 
devolvement of power and responsibility. This kind of control allows 
much of our skill at walking to reside in the linkages and elastic 
properties of muscles and tendons. And it allows (I claim) much of our 
prowess at thought and reason to depend upon the robust and 
reliable operation, often (but not always) in dense brain-involving 
loops, of a variety of non-biological problem-solving resources spread 
throughout our social and technological surround.  
Are the complex distributed systems that result in some sense ‘out of 
control’, beyond the reach of useful (you might even, though 
problematically, say, ‘personal’) governance? I shall argue that they 
are not, although understanding them requires us to re-think some 
key ideas about control and the nature of the self. To (try to) make 
this case, I shall first examine some strategies for efficient, external 
opportunity exploiting control in simple systems.  I shall then argue 
that many of the same lessons apply to the case of higher-level 
human problem-solving.  
 
1. Ecological Control 
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Consider Shakey. Shakey, circa 1970, was the mobile robotic darling 
of the Stanford Research Institute: one of the very first computer-
controlled mobile robots and a locus of hard (non-ecological) control. 
Armed with a camera, wheels, and a laser range–finder, and 
controlled by a big old mainframe whizzing along at 1/4 million 
calculations per second, Shakey could obey typed commands such 
as “Push the cube to the pyramid”. To do so, the system would 
sense, process, plan, and then act out its plan. For Shakey, the body 
and the environment were first and foremost problems to be solved. 
The environment was the problem arena. The sensors detected the 
lay-out in that arena and the reasoning system planned a solution. To 
a large degree, Shakey's body was just another part of the problem 
space: a part that needed to be sent detailed, micro-managing control 
signals so as to put the reasoned-out solution into practice. A 
contemporary analogue, though vastly faster and more sophisticated, 
is Honda’s Asimo. Asimo is a mainstream control paradigm walking 
robot that uses precise joint-angle control to mimic human walking. 
The solution looks pretty good but is massively energy and 
computation expensive.  
Contrast these solutions with the kinds of ecological control deployed 
by Passive Dynamic Walkersiii (PDW’s) Passive Dynamic Walkers 
are simple-looking two-legged devices that employ no actuation 
except gravity, have no control  system as such, and (as a result) can 
enforce no joint angle control at any time. Yet surprisingly, PDW’s are 
capable (when set on a gentle incline) of very stable, human-looking 
walking. Now imagine that you (playing evolution) want to exploit that 
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kind of surprising capacity but in the context of a self-powered 
locomoting agent. The solution, which looks to be Nature's own, is to 
walk using a kind of controlled falling-over. Powered (level terrain) 
walking can thus be brought about by the brain and CNS 
systematically pushing, damping and tweaking a system in which 
Passive Dynamic effects continue to play a very major role.  In such 
cases, a low energy source, a simple control system, and the body 
(and gravity!)  ‘collaborate’ to solve the walking problem. This 
strategy has recently been implemented in a variety of simple robots 
(see Collins et al (2005)) and described as "a new design and control 
paradigm' for walking robots (op cit p.1083). As a second example, 
Tedrake  (2005) has given us 'Robotoddler'. Robotoddler uses actor-
critic reinforcement learning to acquire a control policy that exploits 
the passive dynamics of the body. The robot  learns to change 
speeds and to go forward and backward, and can adapt on the go to  
different terrains, including bricks, wooden tiles, carpet and a variable 
speed treadmill. By using passive dynamic strategies, the robot's 
power consumption is dramatically reduced (to about 1/10th that of a 
standard  robot like Honda's Asimo). 
These examples serve to introduce the notion of soft or ‘ecological’ 
control. This is the kind of control that occurs when a system’s goals 
are not achieved by micro- managing every detail of the desired 
action or response, but by using a strategy that devolves a great deal 
of problem-solving responsibility, making the most of some robust, 
reliable source of relevant order in the body, elsewhere in the brain 
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and/or in local environment (notice that 'ecological control’ thus 
names a type of effect not  a single mechanism). 
The effect of an ecological control strategy is often (though not 
always) the soft-assembly of a solution. Ecological controllers  that 
can learn on-the-go promote soft-assembled solutions, that is to say 
solutions that comprise a temporarily stable assembly of factors and 
forces recruited from whatever happens to be available. Soft 
assembly itself is a notion developed in movement science according 
to which: 
“Movements can be seen as ‘softly-assembled’ patterns 
created and dissolved as tasks and environments change, with 
some patterns easy and preferred, and others more difficult and 
unstable… Moreover, as these synergies are assembled, they 
also take advantage of the non-neural aspects of movement: 
effects of gravity, elastic properties of muscles and inertial 
effects”  
Thelen and  Bates (2003) 
 
Humans belong to the interesting class of what I'd like to call open-
ended ecological controllers. These are systems that seem to be 
specifically designed so as to constantly search for opportunities to 
make the most of body and world, checking for what is available, and 
then (at various time-scales and with varying degrees of difficulty) 
integrating it deeply, creating whole new unified systems of 
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distributed problem-solving. Robotoddler, as we just saw, does this 
open-endedly for walking, but can apply that kind of learning to 
nothing else. We humans seem able to apply the same kinds of 
ecological-control learning much more widely. In fact, human agents 
seem highly engineered so as to be able quite generally to learn to 
make maximal problem-simplifying use of an open-ended variety of 
internal, bodily, or external sources of order. For example, we can 
learn to use tools, sports racquets, and musical instruments in ways 
that exploit the intrinsic dynamics of those material structures  (for 
discussion and lots of examples, see Clark (2003) and Clark 
(forthcoming)). But more importantly for present purposes, there 
seems to be something analogous to (possibly identical with- see 
Christiansen (2004)) ecological control that operates in the cognitive 
domain. 
Thus suppose we ask: could human cognition involve ecologically-
controlled, soft-assembled, distributed systems built of 
heterogeneous parts? I believe (and see Clark (1997) (2003), Clark 
and Chalmers (1998)) that the answer is 'yes' and that minds like 
ours are distinguished, in part, by the ease with which brains like ours 
form larger problem-solving wholes that incorporate and exploit extra-
neural stores, strategies and processes. These larger problem-
solving wholes, I would like to argue, are not simply extended 
cocoons for the 'real' selves, choosing agents and cognitive engines 
hidden deep within. Rather (or so I wish to suggest) they then are 
those selves, agents and cognitive engines. To creep up on this 
initially unsettling idea, let's next turn to the very idea of the self. 
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2. Situating the Self 
Contemporary work on the nature of the self, and on the origins of the 
sense of self, tends to distinguish between two major contributing 
elements. First, there is something like a core sense of ‘being’, which 
involves having a point of view on the world (I see the world from over 
here), having a sense of what I can and cannot do (I can reach and 
grasp that cup, I cannot fly or jump to the roof, etc) and having a 
sense of the limits and placement of my own body in space. Dogs, 
cats and rabbits, as well as human beings, have this core sense of 
their own embodiment and abilities. But second, in the human case, 
at least, there is also something like a complex ‘narrative self’iv. This 
is (roughly speaking) an understanding,  co-constructed by myself 
and others, of the kind of person I am, the kinds of projects and 
interests I have, the shape of my life so far, and so on. 
 
Both elements can be significantly impacted by the opportunistic 
recruitment of external props and aids. Fitted with a shiny new 
prosthetic arm that can lift more weights than before, my direct, 
automatic, sense of what I can and can't do must rapidly alter and 
catch up. Fitted with a cochlear implant that cures my deafness and 
(as a kind of added extra) allows me to hear sounds in ranges that 
most adult humans cannot detect, my core sense of my own auditory 
potential again changes. Accustomed to the (now automatic and 
unreflective) use of, say, a retinal display that allows me to invisibly 
retrieve information from a plug-in or courtesy of a wireless 
accessible database, it seems less and less clear where what “I” 
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know stops and what “it” (the plug-in) makes available starts.  
 
If the latter claim seems less plausible than the others, imagine an 
agent who knows, pretty much by rote, a lot of facts about women's 
basketball.  Now imagine that instead of storing all of those facts in 
your head, you deploy a kind of heads-up display that provides 
instant access to the main performance statistics of key players over 
the last 20 years. The display might be delivered by eyeglasses, or 
even courtesy of a wireless implant sending signals directly into 
visual cortex (rather like certain new-generation cochlear implants- 
see Clark (2003) chapter 1). The system is set-up so that the visual 
sighting of a player’s name, or the auditory pick-up of that name, or 
simply mouthing the name, activates  a kind of Augmented Reality 
visual overlay displaying all the key facts and figures. Imagine, too, 
that the system is fairly flexible, allowing you also to start with 
categories (eg  ‘three-point field goal percentages in the year 2000’) 
or with specifics (‘players with three-point field goal percentages of 
.350 or above’) and to then retrieve information accordingly.  
 
Over a period of use, you become so accustomed to this easy, on-
demand access that the plug-in (for want of a better word) becomes 
automatically, unthinkingly deployed, and that you usually trust what it 
delivers. As a result, perhaps you start to behave, and subsequently 
to feel, as if you simply know which of any two players had the best 
three-point field goal percentage in any given season etc. Would you 
be wrong to feel that? The answer is by no means cut and dried. 
True, your knowing these things depends on the proper operation of 
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the plug-in. But your knowing other things depends, equally, upon the 
proper operation of parts of your brain. And in each case, damage 
and malfunction is always a possibility. True, you need to retrieve the 
information before it is present to your conscious awareness. But 
knowledge stored in long-term biological memory is in the much the 
same boat, until some kind of retrieval process poises it for the 
control of verbal report and intentional action. (For a longer and more 
philosophically nuanced version of this much-compressed argument, 
see Clark and Chalmers (1998)). 
 
A helpful, though at best partial, parallel is with the way our sense of 
‘seeing the whole visual scene before us’ depends, on some 
contemporary models, upon the way information that is not currently 
represented in conscious visual awareness, and  that is ‘stored’ only 
in the external scene itself is nonetheless (thereby) poised for easy 
access by a simple saccade. That poise-for-easy-retrieval is taken for 
granted in our daily planning and acting, and may be the source of 
our feeling that we see detail and color throughout the whole of the 
visual field (for discussion, see Clark (2002a), Noe (2002)).  
This is not to say that there are no interesting differences. For 
example, knowledge stored in long-term biological memory is open to 
all kinds of subterranean processes of integration and interference 
(with both old and newly acquired knowledge). And neurally-stored 
information is fluently accessible by an amazing variety of routes, and 
in a wide variety of situationsv. Nonetheless, the simple feeling of 
‘already knowing’ the answer to a question as soon as it is asked is 
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surely the  knowledge-based equivalent of the more familiar notion of 
‘transparent equipment’: equipment (like the carpenter's hammer) 
with which are so familiar and fluent that we do not think about it in 
use, but rather rely on it to mediate our encounters with a still-wider 
world. Easy access to specific bodies of information, as and when 
such access is normally required, is all it takes for us to factor such 
knowledge in as part of the bundle of skills and abilities that we take 
for granted in our day to day life. And it is this bundle of ‘taken-for-
granted’ skills, knowledge and abilities that - or so I am suggesting- 
quite properly structures and informs our sense of who we are, what 
we know, and what we can do. 
 
 
3. The Shrinking Chooser 
 
If this still feels unnatural, it is largely (I suggest) because we have in 
any case only the most tenuous collective grip on what it means to be 
a choosing, acting ‘self’, or a unified ‘mind’, and because we suffer 
from a chronic tendency to misconstrue the relations between our 
self-conscious “choosings” and the vast webs of non-conscious 
processing activity (all those whirrings and grindings of machinery, 
neural and perhaps non-neural, internal and perhaps external) that 
also structure and determine our own actions and responses.  Until 
we form a better, more consistent image of the relationship between 
these factors, we cannot hope to know ourselves.  
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There is, most (though not all) theorists will agree, a genuine (though 
not always sharp and ‘all-or-nothing’) distinction between those things 
of which I am consciously aware and those things of which I am notvi.  
Right now, for example, I am conscious of the page in front of me, of 
the glare of my desk lamp, and of the difficulty of formulating this 
particular thought!  I am not, however, conscious of all the complex 
low-level visual processing (the parallel processing of multiple 
differential equations) that supports and makes possible my 
conscious visual awareness of the page and the glare. Nor am I 
conscious of whatever complex internal machinations underlie my 
sudden sense than I am here tip-toeing into difficult and dangerous 
territory. Certainly, at any given moment, not all the cognitively 
important goings-on in my brain are present as contents of my current 
conscious awareness.  That is why we sometimes find thoughts and 
ideas, ones that we nevertheless recognize as originated by 
ourselves, simply “popping up in our heads”: they are the intrusive 
conscious fruits of some ongoing, subterranean, non-conscious 
information processing. 
 
It is impossible to underestimate the significance of these non-
conscious cognitive processes in the determination of the mental 
character of a persisting and identifiable thinking being.  We must  
reject the seductive  but ultimately barely intelligible idea that we (qua 
individual, thinking things) are nothing more than a sequence of 
conscious states. The identification of the agent or chooser with such 
a thin slice of themselves obscures the full suite of mechanisms 
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whose co-ordinated action is responsible for much of what is 
distinctive of an individual chooser. The shrinkage would leave us 
with no real grip on the cohesion and continuity that we naturally 
associate with the idea of a single mind, self or chooser persisting 
through time.   
 
It is illuminating, I think, to actually try the following simple 
experiment.  For just ten minutes, keep track (as far as you can) of 
the contents of your conscious awareness.  Unless you are totally 
engaged in a single all-absorbing task, you will probably end up with 
a sequence of often-unconnected thoughts.  A feeling of hunger, a 
thought about consciousness and the self, a worry about a 
forthcoming lecture, a glimmer of sexual arousal, a pang of anxiety, 
an urge to write to an old friend, another thought about the self ( a  
good one- but where did it come from?), the strong desire for a 
coffee, etc., etc.  The sequence of conscious contents is highly varied 
(in type) and radically discontinuous (in content).  Themes persist, 
and whole trains of thought are sometimes, painfully, birthed.  But the 
true principles of continuity, and the bulk of the thinking, choosing 
self, must lie largely underground.   
 
We cannot, it seems, afford to identify ourselves with the conscious 
contents of momentary time-slices. With this in mind Dennett (2003) 
responds to worries (Libet (1985) (1999)) concerning the time-lag 




"Our free will, like all our other mental powers, has to be 
smeared out over time, not measured at instants. Once you 
distribute the work done…in both space and time in the brain, 
you have to distribute the moral agency around as well. You are 
not out of the loop; you are the loop"     
Dennett (2003) p. 242 
 
Taking the whole loop of temporally and spatially spread cognitive 
activity seriously is, however, already to take the crucial step towards 
understanding ourselves as ecological control systems capable of 
incorporating external structures deep into their cognitive routines.  
For the choices before us are now relatively stark: 
 
Either, treat the mind and self as nothing but the shifting set of 
momentary 'conscious' contents (thus shrinking mind and self 
beyond recognition) 
 
Or, allow mind and self to depend upon the ongoing co-
ordinated activity of multiple temporally spread conscious and 
non-conscious processes, thus inviting us to also consider 
certain non-biological members of the class of non-conscious 
processes to contribute as deeply to the mechanical 




The challenge, in other words, is this. Given the profound role of non-
conscious, opportunistically recruited neural resources in the 
intentional origination of action, show us why (apart from some un-
argued prejudice) the machinery of mind and self should be restricted 
to the neural, the inner, or the biological. We need to seriously 
question the idea that neural, inner and/or biological goings-on are in 
some way incredibly special. We need to rid ourselves of the idea 
that our brains are somehow touched with the magic dust that makes 
them suitable to act as the physical machinery of mind and self, while 
the non-biological stuff must forever remain mere slave and tool. The 
relations between our conscious sense of self (our explicit plans and 
projects, and our sense of our own personality, capacities, bodily 
form, location and limits) and the many non-conscious neural goings-
on that structure and inform this cognitive profile are, it seems to me, 
pretty much on a par with the relations between our conscious minds 
and various kinds of transparent, reliable, robust and readily 
accessed non-biological resource.  When those resources are of a 
recognisably knowledge-and-information based kind, the upshot is an 
extended cognitive system: a bio-technologically hybrid mind, a bio-
technologically hybrid self.   
Is this merely arguing over words? Why should we worry whether we 
accept well-integrated bio-external elements as aspects of the 
physical machinery of self and mind? The deepest reason to care, it 
seems to me, is that to fail to do so is to implicitly accept a model 
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according to which the machinery of the self becomes identified with 
the machinery of conscious reason. This leads directly to a variety of 
fears and worries (Wegner (2002 ) is a nice example) concerning the 
authorship of many perfectly intentional actions. The remedy is to see 
that the choosing agent is not somehow hidden within the machinery 
whose operations are most accessible to consciousness. Rather, she 
is the whole well-tuned ensemble capable of taking responsibility for 
actions and of initiating actions that make sense in the light of her 
long-term projects and commitments. 
Gallagher (2005) extends the Dennettian view in just this way, writing 
that: 
 
"I don't disagree with Dennett concerning the role played by 
nonconscious elements, except that I think we are even larger 
than he thinks- we are not just what happens in our brains. The 
'loop' extends though and is limited by our bodily capabilities, 
into the surrounding environment, which is social as well as 
physical, and feeds back through our conscious experience into 
the decisions we make" 
Gallagher (2005) p.242 
 
Confronted with this general class of proposal, according to which the 
machinery of mind extends out into the surrounding world, many 
people feel deeply uncomfortable.  How, they ask, could something to 
which I (they mean the conscious mind) may have so little detailed 
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access count as in any way a proper part of me?  How could, to take 
an admittedly extreme case, the ongoing daily computations of a 
software agent that only ever reports back when it has found some 
tasty mercantile morsel count as part of my own mechanistic 
underpinnings? We may feel easier about this, I suspect, once we 
face up to the fact that this kind of relation already obtains between 
the conscious mind and sizeable chunks of our on-board neural 
machinery. 
To see this quite concretely, imagine you are now reaching for that 
coffee cup sitting before you on the desk.  It may seem to you that 
your hand and finger motions are being sensitively guided by your 
own conscious seeing.  This, however, is not really the case.  In fact, 
fine-tuned reaching and grasping involves the delicate use of visually-
received information by functionally and neuro-anatomically distinct 
sub-systems operating, for the most part, outside the window of 
conscious awareness. It is this non-conscious circuitry that guides the 
most delicate shape-and-position sensitive aspects of reach and 
grasp. (For a radical version of this, see Milner and Goodale (1995). 
For a more balanced account, see Jacobs and Jeannerod (2003)). In 
a similar way, it is the non-conscious use of visual information that is 
responsible for many of our fine postural corrections and 
compensations (standing up while riding a bus, for example). 
 
Even in the case of our own biological brains, then, the conscious self 
is in (direct, micro-managing) control of much less than we think.  Not 
just the “autonomic” functions (breathing, heart-beat, etc.) but all 
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kinds of human activities turn out to be partly supported by quasi-
independent non-conscious sub-systems.  This is no surprise, I am 
sure, to any sports player: it doesn’t even seem, when playing a fast 
game of squash, as if your conscious perception of the ball is, 
moment-by-moment, guiding your hand and racket.  Nor should it 
come as a surprise to artists and scientists, who are often painfully 
aware that the bulk of their own (intentional, owned, self-expressing) 
creative activity flows from subterranean and non-conscious sources. 
 
What seems to matter, for our daily sense of effective agency and 
choice, is  (i) that the conscious mind has a rough and fallible sense 
of what she (the embodied, embedded, perhaps technologically 
extended, agent)  knows, wants, and can and can’t do, and (ii) that 
sometimes at least, conscious rehearsal can be an active part of the 
process that leads, within that complex economy, to intentional 
action. The conscious contribution here need amount to no more than 
a gentle but subjectively experienced nudge that tips the balance of a 
complex, and to a large extent unconsciously self-organizing, system.  
The conscious mind, I am thus suggesting, is well-placed to act as an 
ecological controller in the sense outlined in the opening sections. It 
is for this reason that the fear of “loss of control,” as we cede more 
and more to non-conscious inner processes and to a supporting web 
of non-biological scaffolding is misplaced.  For what matters is not 
that the conscious self be micro-managing every detail of every sub-
routine, but that working together, the conscious mind and a variety of 
non-conscious sub-systems provide useable, robust support for the 
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kinds of life we lead and the kinds of activity we value. The conscious 
mind, on this model, finally emerges as something like a new-style 
business manager whose role is not to micro-manage but to set long-
term goals, pursue some slow deliberative reasoning, and gently 
nudge the larger system in certain directions, all the while actively 
creating and maintaining the kinds of conditions in which the overall 
distributed cognitive economy performs at its bestvii.  
 
4. The Buck that Never Stops 
 
A common objection, at about this point, goes something like this: 
even if external, non-biological elements do sometimes help us – 
quite profoundly – in our problem-solving activities, still isn’t it always 
at least our biological brains that have the final say?  The mental 
buck stops there.  The brain is where I am because the brain is the 
controller and chooser of my actions in a way this other stuff  
(software, pen, paper, palm-pilot) is not.  And that, it may be 
suggested, is why the non-biological stuff should not count as part of 
the real self or cognitive system, and why our minds are not hybrids 
built of biological and technological parts. Human minds, so the 
obvious objection goes, are good old fashioned biological minds, 
albeit ones that enjoy a nice wrap-around of power-enhancing tools 
and culture. 
 
This sounds sensible and proper. Until we turn up the magnification 
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on the biological brain itself. Notice first that many processes involved 
in the selection and control of actions are routinely off-loaded, by the 
biological brain, onto the non-biological environment.  Think of the 
knot in the hanky, the automated desktop diary, and the software 
agent empowered to purchase.  In reply to such an observation the 
sceptic is likely to invoke some kind of ultimate authority” “Who was it 
that decided to knot the hanky, the sceptic demands? The biological 
brain, that’s ‘who’, and that’s YOU. Who was it that empowered the 
software agents to purchase? The same old brain, the same old 
YOU!” 
 
But this reply is a major hostage to fortune.  For suppose we now ask 
some parallel questions within the neuro-biological nexus itself.  Do 
we now conclude that the real “me” is to be identified only with those 
select elements of the neural machinery involved in ultimate decision-
making?  Suppose only my frontal lobes have the final say?  Does 
that shrink the physical machinery of  mind and self to just the frontal 
lobes?  What if, as the philosopher Daniel Dennett suspects, no 
neural sub-system has always and everywhere the final say?  Has 
the mind and self simply disappeared? As Jerry Fodor once said: 
 
“If, in short, there is a community of computers living in my 
head, there had also better be somebody who is in charge; and 
, by God, it had better be me” Fodor (1998) p 207. 
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What we really need to reject, I suggest, is the seductive idea that all 
these various neural and non-neural tools need a kind of stable, 
detached user. Instead, it is just tools all the way down. Some of 
those tools are indeed more closely implicated in our conscious 
awareness of the world than others.  But those elements, taken on 
their own, fall embarrassingly short of constituting any recognizable 
version of a human mind or of an individual person. Some elements, 
likewise, must be more important to our sense of self and identity 
than others. And some elements will play larger roles in control and 
decision-making than others. But this divide, like the ones before it, 
tends to cross-cut the inner and the outer, the biological and the non-
biological. Different neural circuits provide different capacities, and 
contribute in different ways to our sense of self, of where we are, of 
what we can do, and to decision-making and choice.  External, non-
biological elements provide still further capacities, and contribute in 
additional ways to our sense of who we are, where we are, what we 
can do, and to decision-making and choice.  But no single tool 
amongst this complex kit is intrinsically thoughtful, ultimately in full 
control, or plausibly identified as the  inner ‘seat of the self’. We (we 
human individuals) just are these shifting coalitions (see Ainslie 
(2001), Ross (this volume)) of tools. We are  “soft-selves,” 
continuously open to change and driven to leak through the confines 
of skin and skull, annexing more and more non-biological elements 
as aspects of the machinery of mind itself.  
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The metaphor of 'tools all the way down' may seem to threaten, as 
Don Ross (personal communication) notes, to deconstruct itself. How 
can 'tools' be the right notion in the absence of a central intelligent 
user? The air of paradox is intentional. For the user is nothing but the 
cumulative effect of the co-active unfolding  of the various resources 
supporting different aspects of adaptive response. This unfolding is 
determined by a delicate mix of sparse ecological control and pure 
self-organization. The user is what we see (in others and ourselves) 
when all this is working properly: a more-or-less rational being 
pursuing a more-or-less unified set of goals and projects (see Rovane 
(1998)). 
The role of others in all this is not to be underappreciated. Ross (this 
volume) makes a powerful case that that humans (like other animals) 
communicate and bargain non-linguistically using multiple analog 
signaling systems (think of the continuous variety of small facial and 
bodily motions that may convey pleasure or displeasure, or 
encouragement to approach or retreat). But when such agents are 
also able to label their own states and those of others (pinning them 
down, for example, as “attracted” or “un-attracted”, “interested” or “not 
interested” and so on) they enter into a new kind of arena, one whose 
dynamics can be stabilized by a series of such all-or-nothing (digital) 
commitments. (These are achieved, for example, whenever one 
agent labels another’s state and the other does not reject the label). 
Further negotiations and co-ordinations among this group can then 
be predicated upon this stable base-line of publicly endorsed digital 
commitments. Ross depicts such practices as recursively agent-
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generating: that is to say, the agents that enter into the digitally-
modulated negotiation (or other co-ordination project) are defined, in 
part, by these very sets of commitments, and the new utility functions 
that accompany them.  
Despite all this we are prone, it seems, to a particularly dangerous 
kind of cognitive illusion.  Because our best efforts at watching our 
own minds in action reveal only the conscious flow of ideas and 
decisions, we mistakenly identify ourselves with this stream of 
conscious awareness. Then, when in our more scientific moments we 
begin to enquire into the material and physical underpinnings of the 
mind and self, it can quickly seem as if much (though not all) of the 
brain and all the rest of the body, not to mention the surrounding 
social and technological webs, are just tools for that conscious user. 
This is the mistake that led Avicenna, the Islamic philosopher quoted 
at the start of the chapter, to depict his own bodily limbs as “no more 
than garments”. But garments for what? A conscious Cartesian self 
perhaps? To pursue this route is to embrace a hideously disfigured 
image of the mind and self , privileging a vanishingly small piece of 
the true personal and cognitive pie. 
 
A better bet, as we have already begun to see, is the de-centralized, 
distributed, heterogeneous vision of the machinery of mind and self 
powerfully championed by the philosopher Daniel Dennett (see 
especially Dennett (1991)).  Much of Dennett’s work sets out to 
oppose the persuasive image of the “Cartesian Theatre”: the mythical 
place inside our brains where sensory inputs, thought and ideas are 
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all inspected by a “central meaner” whose well-informed choices 
determine our deliberate actions.  Dennett marshals a plethora of 
philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific evidence against 
such a view.  His target is often thought to be simply the idea of a 
neural or functional center of consciousness.  But Dennett’s deeper 
quarry, or so it has always seemed to me, has been the idea of a 
central self, a small-but-potent internal user relative to whom all the 
rest – be it neural, bodily or technological- is mere tool-kit. Where we 
hallucinate a central self, some spiritual or neural point wherein our 
special individual essence resides, Dennett finds only a grab-bag of 
tools, and an ongoing narrative: a story we (the ensemble of tools) 
spin to make sense of our actions, proclivities and projects.  
According to Dennett, we are our own best story, and our sense of 
self is a kind of artifact, useful for many purposes, but best taken with 
a pinch of salt.  
 
I shall not rehearse or critique Dennett’s arguments here (though I 
have done so at some length elsewhere- see for example Clark 
(2002b)).  Instead, I simply note that our earlier reflections lead us to 
the very same conclusions, unpalatable though they may initially 
seem.  There is no self, if by self we mean some central cognitive 
essence that makes me who and what I am.  In its place there is just 
the “soft self”: a rough-and-tumble control-sharing coalition of 
processes – some neural, some bodily, some technological – and an 
ongoing drive to tell a story, to paint a picture in which “I” am the 
central player.  
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Giving up on the image of a hard central self raises a thorny problem.  
What, then, makes a grab-bag of tools (a grab-bag whose specific 
elements may shift and change over time) into a unified, cohesive 
self?  Part of the answer, to be sure, is that we simply hallucinate 
more unity and cohesion than in fact exists.  Related to this is the 
pragmatic point that for many social and legal purposes, it is 
convenient to simply identify the agent with the core biological 
ensemble. We imprison the body and brain, not the laptop!  But we 
do this despite knowing that individual bits of neural circuitry (my 
hippocampus, let’s say) are themselves as incapable of being ‘guilty’ 
as the laptop! What we are really doing is rejecting a pattern of 
behaviour that has itself emerged from a whole social and bio-
technological matrix. 
 
But another, perhaps more interesting, part of the answer is that the 
unity and cohesion of the self, and the distinctness of the self (the 
sense we have of being individual agents, located thus-and-so, 
confronting a wider world) are not simple givens.  Instead, they are 
(imperfect and constantly vulnerable) achievements. In other work I  
have discussed how the sense of location and body boundaries is 
constructed on the basis of co-ordinated signals arising within 
perception-action cycles. (see Clark (2003) chapter 4).  The pre-
conditions for the emergence of a rich sense of self begin to be met, I 
suspect, when on the basis of such information a loose-knit system 
begins to stabilize itself and to actively protect its own problem-
solving infra-structure.  
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Thus reflect on the (superficially disproportionate) vexation of the 
child whose parents enter and slightly re-arrange her bedroom when 
she is not around. The feeling is one of almost personal assault. The 
room, organized in a certain way, was integral to the child’s modes of 
play and study. To borrow an even simpler example, most of us keep 
our drinking glasses in a certain cupboard in the house. By actively 
stabilizing this environmental structure (putting clean glasses back in 
that same cupboard) we simplify the problem of future glass-location. 
Or consider the way files are arranged and stored in your own office. 
Our offices are organized in highly individual ways, dovetailed to our 
specific needs and to our different neuro-biological profiles We 
human beings actively organize our own local environments for 
cognitive purposes, and then take steps to protect this achieved 
organization (woe to the cleaner who disturbs the piles). Again and 
again we act so as to stabilize our local environments in ways that 
simplify or enhance the problem-solving that needs to be done.  All 
this is a close cousin, I claim, to our carefully constructed and 
defended notion of a bounded self. The narrative-spinning drive 
(clearly evidenced in well-known studies of the tendency towards 
confabulation - see e.g. Nisbett and Ross (1980)) when confronted 
with such active efforts at stabilization, tends (I conjecture) to project 
the principle of stabilization further and further inwards, inclining us to 
hallucinate a single, central organizing self.   
 
Imagine a pile of sand, deposited roughly on the ground, which is 
slowly settling into a stable arrangement of grains.  Were the pile of 
sand self-aware, it too might hallucinate a kind of inner essence: a 
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special grain or set of grains whose deliberate actions sculpt the rest 
into a stable arrangement. But there is no such essence.  The sand 
pile simply self-organized into a more-or-less stable coalition of 
grains. Similarly, (and here I also refer the reader to Dennett's classic 
( 1974)  discussion of the 'law of effect') certain coalitions of biological 
and non-biological problem-solving elements  (‘grab-bags of mind-
tools’) prove more stable and (hence) enduring than others. These 
configurations have a tendency to preserve and even repeat 
themselves. When viewed by a conscious, narrative-spinning 
element, this all looks like the work of some central organizer: the real 
self, the real mind, the real source of all that observed order.  Thus, 
perhaps, is born the image of the self as a critical yet vanishingly slim 
slice of the overall problem-solving ensemble (brain, body, cognitive 
technologies): a slice so slim and elusive that our own neural circuits 
('my' hippocampus, 'my' frontal lobes) can quickly seem like its tools! 
 
That little story is mere speculation. But however it arises, this notion 
of a real, central, yet wafer-thin self is a profound mistake. It is a 
mistake which blinds us to our real nature, and leads us to radically 
undervalue (and misconceive) the roles of context, culture, 
environment and technology in the constitution of individual human 
persons.  To face up to our true nature (soft-selves, distributed de-
centralized coalitions) is to recognise the inextricable intimacy of self, 
mind and world.  
 
5. Finding the Balance. 
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But not so fast.  Isn't there a tension in the story as I have told it? On 
the one hand, I want to speak of the conscious mind as a source (or 
sources) of ecological control, adding crucial nudges to the complex 
dynamics of much larger (potentially hybrid) cognitive and behavioral 
systems. On the other hand, I want to depict us as soft selves: de-
centralized, distributed and self-organizing systems that just happen 
to have a perspective on their own activity and an accompanying 
story to tell. How can both stories be true? 
A suggestive move is made by Velleman (2000), who notes that our 
own verbal utterances, encountered in the context of a narrative-
spinning drive, may at times serve the purpose of helping to bring 
about the very thing they depict us as about to do. This is a function 
they could perform even in the context of a system that is largely self-
organizing in just the way Dennett suggests. For example, if late at 
night I say to you "I'm leaving now", I may say this in part as a means 
of bringing it about that I do, in fact leave - that I leave, shall we say, 
despite my self-perceived urge to continue our conversation. This 
strategy can work, according to Velleman, because as a rampant 
narrator of my own life story, I am driven to strive for consistency, for 
alignment between behavior and narrative. So by saying that I am 
about to do so and so, I increase the costs to myself of not so doing. 
This trick (the addition of a new narrative-induced cost to not doing so 
and so) would work for silent inner rehearsal as well as for overt 
speech. The conscious thought or overt utterance that depicts me, to 
myself, as about to do so and so thus makes it more likely that I will in 
fact do what I think or say. The key (as Ismael (ms) (forthcoming) 
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nicely notes) is simply to make the narrative run ahead, into the 
future, so that the drive for consistency and  alignment acts as a 
causal influence on what we then do, rather than a post-hoc (and 
sometimes demonstrably ad hocviii)  commentary on what we have 
already chosen or done.  
Ismael (ms) (forthcoming) then uses this as the springboard for a 
related but much stronger move. What is right in Velleman's position, 
she suggests, is his recognition that "if the brain is generating a self-
representation, there’s no reason that the thing can’t have a role in 
the determination of behavior, indeed, no reason that it can’t acquire 
an increasingly prominent role" (ms p. 6). (By a 'self--representation' 
Ismael seems to mean any kind of internal model that contains even 
a partial representation of the agent as a distinct property-bearing 
individual, so any Dennett-style narrative-spinning engine should 
count as a self-representation). But as soon as such a self-
representation assumes some kind of causal role (whether by the 
neat trick of forward-narrating or any other means), we are no longer 
(according to Ismael) dealing with a simple self-organizing system 
that just happens to spin a story about itself. Rather, we are dealing 
with a system that really does include a self-model as an active 
principle of organization. Not self-organization but organization by a 
self-model! Such systems may behave in ways that are more flexible 
(so the argument continues) than any first-order self-organizing 
system, because they can use the self-model to select between 
multiple responses in ways that are driven by that model, hence by 
stored memories, representations of goals and so on. 
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In this story, the stress on various forms of higher-level control seems 
to me exactly right, as does the observation that such control may 
often require the system to deploy some kind of model of its own 
nature, history, or dynamics. But for my own part, I remain wary of the 
idea of any single such self-model, and much more inclined (see 
Clark (1997)) towards a vision of multiple partial models, most of 
which may be relatively low-level (such as a variety of forward models 
of bodily dynamics- see below). As far as the most inclusive and 
abstract such 'self-model' goes (the one that corresponds most 
closely to the narrative self), I wonder what the notion of a model here 
adds to the simpler notion of systems that know some stuff about 
themselves and use that knowledge to help select actions? Perhaps 
then the contrast between self-organizing and self-governing systems 
is not as sharp as it first seemsix? 
Ismael thus depicts a kind of conflict between what she calls self-
governing models (ones in which a self-representation plays a crucial, 
flexibility-promoting causal role) and truly self-organizing ones, in 
which there is only input-driven self-organization plus a spun 
narrative. The notion of ecological control, I want finally to suggest, 
begins to show us how to reconcile these two notionsx, and hence 
how to reconcile Dennett's emphasis on the unreality of selves with 
Ismael's recognition that agents with some kind of self-model may 
exhibit complex dynamics that are the causal consequence of that 
very self-model.  For what I am calling ecological control is what you 
get when you add an inter-animated and changeable variety of thin 
slices of self-governance to a system in which the intrinsic, self-
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organizing properties of many subsystems are allowed to bear a lot 
(but not all) of the problem-solving strain. The self-actuating passive 
dynamic walker whose direction of travel and speed of walking is 
selected by a local supervisory system empowered to nudge and 
tweak the mechanically coupled leg system exploits a potent 
combination of self-organization and self-governance. Importantly, 
self-governance, as I am understanding it, may be the province not of 
any single inner self-model but of a variety of partialxi self-governing 
strategies, some of which may themselves involves circuitry spanning 
brain, body and world, and themselves orchestrated via a higher-level 
kind of self-organization. According to such a picture, overall self-
governance, though real and important, is the emergent outcome of 
the action of a whole complex of partial self, body and world models 
acting as mini ecological controllers in a distributed cognitive 
economy. Some of these may be simple forward models of the 
dynamics of bodily sub-systems (see eg Miall and Wolpert (1996), 
Clark and Grush (1999)), while others may be more tightly woven 
with systems for episodic memory and for categorization.  
In all cases, though, the self-governance works only because it is 
delicately and continuously keyed to (and often highly exploitative of) 
a variety of sources of order inherent in the rest of the system. True 
(flexible, efficient, robust) self-governance thus positively requires, or 
so I want to suggest, the use of 'soft' ecological control strategies: 
ones that are maximally exploitative of the order and intelligence that 
is distributed throughout the larger system. This suite of soft, 
hybridization-favoring, partial self-governing routines cannot 
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reconstruct a stereotypic Cartesian mind or a traditional single central 
self. To that extent we may appreciate what is correct in Dennett's 
depiction of (that kind of) self as a kind of illusion, while  embracing 
the causal potency of (perhaps a variety of) empirically real partial 
self (and world) models, some of which link memory and motivation to 
action and choice. 
Conclusions: Situations and Persons 
How can we reconcile  the vision of human agents as distributed, 
hybrid problem-solving ensembles with the vision of human agents 
as, indeed, agents: as autonomous individuals exercising  control and 
choice? Viewing ourselves as loci of multiple systems of ecological 
control may provide a useful tool to attempt such a reconciliation. 
Ecological control systems are, first and foremost, essentially 
opportunistic and exploitative. They take whatever is around, and 
build it into fluent problem-solving routines. But they are nonetheless 
controllers in good standing, able to tweak and nudge complex 
systems in ways that promote goal-driven activity and flexible 
adaptive response. Seeing ourselves as biologically-based (but not 
biologically imprisoned) engines of ecological control may help us to 
develop a species self-image more adequate to the open-ended 
processes of physical and cognitive self-creation that make us who 
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i Ibn Sina Avicenna was a Persian philosopher-scientist who lived between 980 
and 1037 A.D. The quote is from R. Martin's unpublished translation of his De 
Anima (Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus) vol 7 . 
 
ii Stelarc is an Australian performance artist whose work explores the 
technological transformations of embodied experience. The quote is from the 
Stelarc website at www.stelarc.va.com.au 
 
iii Much of this work originated in the Andy Ruina Lab, Cornell and with  
original work by Tad McGeer. 
 
iv See Dennett (1991) chapter 13, Damasio (1999) chapter 7. 
 
v For discussion of the impact of such differences on the arguments for the 
'extended mind', see Adams and Aizawa (2001), Clark (2005). 
 
vi Dennett might seem to reject this claim, as when he writes that "we cannot 
draw the line separating our conscious mental states from our unconscious 
mental states" (1991, p.447). But he does not deny that many key processes 
operate at what he himself initially dubbed the 'sub-personal level'. And 
certainly, Dennett would not deny that much of what structures my behaviour 
emanates from purely sub-personal processes. I think that Dennett's real target is 
the idea that within the smaller class of potentially directly reportable goings-on, 
there is a neat line between those that are at this moment conscious and those 
that are not. See e.g. Dennett (1997). 
 
 
vii The skill of successful self-management is thus pretty much the same skill as 
management in certain new business sectors. In each case what matters is 
knowing how to exercise rather indirect, softly softly, forms of intervention and 
control: what Kevin Kelly (1994 p.330) nicely dubs ‘co-control’. Co-control is 
what you get when an ecological controller has opportunistically recruited a 
motley of resources to deal with a current need or problem.  
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viii I am thinking here of the empirical evidence (though see section 4 above) to 
suggest that our chosen actions are frequently the results of unconscious activity 
that precedes the experience of conscious will. See e.g.  Libet (1985), and more 
recent demonstrations such as Wegner (2002). For an interesting review, see 
Haggard (2005). 
 
ix Indeed, Ismael notes that the contrast between self-governing and self-
organizing systems is 'not a dichotomy' and that 'most animate systems fall 
somewhere in the space between those with fixed and those with flexible 
response functions' (ms) 
 
x One potentially important difference is that Ismael  thinks that the relation of 
true dynamical coupling, in which 'controller' (ecological or otherwise) and 
'controlled' are engaged in a continuous reciprocal exchange, introduces 
important complexities and undermines the attempt to couch the relation in 
quite those terms. The notion of an ecological controller, Ismael might object, 
implies a kind of divisibility that ongoing coupled influence (between self-model 
and whole embodied system) cannot underwrite. Thus she writes that in such 
cases "there is no  simple way to  decompose the system into dynamically 
separable units" (ms p.10) For my own part, I don't yet see why this makes a 
significant difference. For the roles of the parts seem distinct enough, even if 
their ongoing co-evolution resists decomposition. For example, one part of the 
system may have access to stored memories and a self-profile while another, 
though constantly coupled to it, does not. 
 
xi For something like this vision of multiple partial models as a mode of control, 
see Arbib (1993 ) 
